Bank capital : lessons from the financial crisis by Demirguc-Kunt, Asli et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5473
Bank Capital
























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5473
Using a multi-country panel of banks, the authors study 
whether better capitalized banks fared better in terms of 
stock returns during the financial crisis. They differentiate 
among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk-
adjusted ratio; the leverage ratio; the Tier I and Tier II 
ratios; and the common equity ratio. They find several 
results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not 
affect subsequent stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, 
higher capital resulted in better stock performance, most 
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on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at ademirguckunt@worldbank.org, edetragiache@
imf.org, omerrouche@worldbank.org.
markedly for larger banks and less well-capitalized banks; 
(iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is 
stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio 
rather than the risk-adjusted capital ratio; (iv) there is 
evidence that higher quality forms of capital, such as 
Tier 1 capital, were more relevant. They also examine 
the relationship between bank capitalization and credit 
default swap (CDS) spreads. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Since the first Basel capital accord in 1988, the prevailing approach to bank regulation has put 
capital at front and center: more capital should make banks better able to absorb losses with their 
own resources, without becoming insolvent or necessitating a bailout with public funds. In 
addition, minimum capital requirements should curb incentives for excessive risk taking created 
by limited liability and amplified by deposit insurance and bailout expectations by forcing bank 
owners to have some “skin in the game”. Over the last 20 years, regulatory capital requirements 
have been refined and broadened to cover various types of risk, differentiate among asset classes 
of different risk, and allow for a menu of approaches to determine the risk weights to be applied 
to each asset category. In the process, the rules have become increasingly elaborate, reflecting 
the growing complexity of modern banks, but also the need to address ongoing efforts by 
regulated banks to circumvent the requirements through financial innovation.
1     
While regulatory consensus has viewed capital as an essential tool to limit risk in banking, there 
has been less agreement among economic theorists. A number of theoretical models bear out the 
relationship posited by regulators that minimum capital requirements ameliorate the moral 
hazard created by deposit insurance (Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990; 
Rochet, 1992), but others find that such requirements, by reducing the charter value of banks, 
have the opposite effect (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988). Calem and 
Rob (1998) reconciles these different views: in a dynamic model in which banks build up capital 
through retained earnings, this paper shows that when capital is low relative to the regulatory 
minimum banks choose a very risky loan portfolio to maximize the option value of deposit 
insurance. As capital increases and future insolvency becomes less likely, on the other hand, 
incentives to take on risk are curbed by the desire to preserve the bank’s charter value. When 
banks are so well capitalized that insolvency is remote, an additional increase in capital induces 
banks to take on more risk to benefit from the upside. In this model, the relationship between 
bank capital and risk is U-shaped.
2  
The recent financial crisis undoubtedly demonstrated that existing capital regulation, in its design 
or its implementation, was inadequate to prevent a panic in the financial sector, and once again 
governments around the world had to step in with emergency support to prevent a collapse.
 3 
Many of the banks that were rescued appeared to be in compliance with minimum capital 
requirements shortly before and even during the crisis. In the ensuing debate over how to 
strengthen regulation, capital continues to play an important role. A consensus is being forged 
around a new set of capital standards (Basel III), with the goal of making capital requirements 
more stringent. In July 2010, the Basel Committee agreed to introduce a Tier 1 leverage ratio of 
3 percent on a trial basis, and later on, in September 2010, it formulated new, strengthened risk-
                                                 
1 See Caprio and Honohan (1999) for a discussion. 
2 For a review of the literature on bank capital, see for instance Santos (2001).  
3 See, for instance, Viñals et al. (2010), Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2010), Demirgüç-Kunt and Serven 
(2010), and Merrouche and Nier (2010). 3 
 
adjusted capital requirements. Specifically, the common equity ratio will increase from 2 to 4.5 
percent, with an additional counter-cyclical buffer of 0-2.5 percent at the discretion of country 
supervisors. In addition, banks will be required to hold a “capital conservation” buffer of an 
additional 2.5 percent of common equity, bringing the total to 7 percent. The Tier 1 capital 
requirement will increase to 6 percent from 4 percent, while the total risk-adjusted capital 
requirement will remain unchanged at the existing 8 percent level. Banks will be able to meet the 
difference between the total capital requirement and the Tier 1 requirement with Tier 2 capital. 
Definitions of various forms of capital have also become more stringent. All changes will be 
phased in gradually, and the transition will have to be completed by 2019.   
In this paper we try to make a contribution to understanding the role of bank capital by studying 
whether banks that were better capitalized experienced a smaller decline in their stock market 
value during the financial crisis. If bank capital truly helps in curbing bank risk-taking incentives 
and absorbing losses, we would expect that, when a large, unexpected negative shock to bank 
value materializes – as was the case with the financial crisis that began in August 2007 – equity 
market participants would judge better capitalized banks to be in a better position to withstand 
the shock, and the stock price of these banks would not fall as much as that of poorly capitalized 
banks.  
A second question that we address in the paper is which concept of capital was more relevant to 
stock valuation during the crisis. Existing capital requirements are set as a proportion of risk 
exposure; but if the risk exposure calculation under Basel rules did not reflect actual risk, capital 
measures based on cruder risk-exposure proxies, such as total assets, may be have been 
considered as more meaningful by equity traders (Blum, 2007).  
A third issue is the types of instrument that are counted as capital for regulatory purposes. As 
recognized by the Basel Committee (2009), under current standards some banks were able to 
show strong capitalization while holding a limited amount of tangible common equity, which is 
the component of capital that is available to absorb losses while the bank remains a going 
concern. In our regressions, we test whether banks with higher quality capital were viewed more 
positively by equity market participants.  
Because we use a panel of banks from several countries, in our tests we can use country-time 
dummy variables to control for all country and time-specific factors potentially affecting stock 
returns, including differences in interest rates and other macroeconomic variables, the severity of 
the financial crisis and its economic repercussions across countries, different policy responses by 
the authorities, different quality of bank regulation and supervision, and differences in 
accounting and regulatory standards. This approach greatly reduces concerns about possible 
omitted variables.  
We find support for the hypothesis that better capitalized banks experienced a smaller decline in 
their equity value during the crisis. However, the effect is large and robust only for a subsample 
comprising the larger banks. For this group, we also find that stock returns during the crisis were 
more sensitive to the leverage ratio than to the risk-adjusted Basel ratio, an indication that market 4 
 
participants may have viewed the risk-adjustment under Basel as uninformative. Finally, we also 
find some evidence that Tier 1 capital was seen as the more relevant notion of capital, especially 
in the sample of larger banks.  
Our dependent variable, the stock return, is an imperfect proxy for bank performance during a 
crisis because it reflects changes in value to stockholders only, and does not reflect changes in 
the value of debt. In addition, the expectation of government support packages may have blurred 
the effects of the crisis on bank values. While recognizing these limitations, we believe that 
changes in equity values are informative as to the differential effects of the crisis on bank value. 
Also, to explore a possible effect of capital on the value of debt, we test whether bank 
capitalization explained changes in bank CDS premia during the crisis, and we find no 
significant effects.  
Our paper is related to work by Estrella, Park, and Peristiani (2000), who test how alternative 
capital ratios fare in predicting U.S. bank failures in the early 1990s, and find that a leverage 
ratio performs just as well as a risk-adjusted measure of capital. Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
explore the relationship between bank capital and different aspects of banks performance in 
crises and tranquil times for U.S. banks. Crises include both banking crises and stock market 
crashes. Among their tests is a comparison of excess stock returns on a portfolio of well 
capitalized banks and one of poorly capitalized banks during the recession of the early 1990s and 
during the recent subprime crisis. According to this study, better capitalized banks did 
significantly better in the early 1990s, but not in the recent crisis. The study does not explore the 
potentially different role of alternative concepts of bank capital. Recent work by Beltratti and 
Stulz (2009) examines how differences in bank corporate governance and country-level 
regulatory approaches affected bank stock returns in the financial crisis. The main findings are 
that banks with a board of directors that is less shareholder-oriented and banks that are located in 
countries with strong capital regulation performed better. Consistent with our results, this study 
also finds that higher capital is associated with better stock market performance.  
The paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the data and the empirical model. 
Section III contains the main results. Section IV concludes. 
II.   SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA DESCRIPTION, AND EMPIRICAL MODEL  
Sample selection  
We construct a sample of banks starting with the all the banks in the Bankscope database that are 
listed and hence have a stock price. We then exclude banks for which no information is available 
on capital or other explanatory variables. We also exclude a few banks from countries in the 
Persian Gulf where the financial crisis followed a different time pattern than the rest of the 
sample. In addition, since we rely on intra-country variation to identify the relationships of 
interest, we exclude from the sample countries/dates for which we have less than five banks in 
the sample. The baseline sample includes a total of 381 banks in 12 economies during the period 
Q1.2005-Q1.2009.
 Not all banks enter the sample in every quarter, as the sample is unbalanced. 5 
 
The sample size in each quarter varies between 273 and 313. 
4 Appendix Table A1 lists the 
countries in our sample and indicators of coverage. All the countries in the sample are advanced 
countries, and U.S. and Japanese banks dominate the sample. In a robustness test, we estimate 
the model with weighed least squares to check whether this characteristic of the sample matters, 
and we find that it does not. The ratio of total assets of the banks in our sample to GDP varies 
between about 144 percent (Hong Kong) and 18 percent (U.S.), with an average of 45 percent of 
GDP.  
Throughout the paper, we also show estimation results for a subsample including only very large 
banks, i.e. banks with assets above U.S. $50 billion. This sample includes a total of 91 banks 
from 8 countries (with sample size in each quarter between 58 and 66 banks). It accounts for 
about 20 percent of the number of banks and 65 percent of total assets of the full sample. The 
rationale for focusing on the largest banks is that typically these are the more sophisticated 
institutions that operate on a global scale with complex balance sheets. These may be the banks 
with more opaque assets and in a better position to skirt capital regulation through regulatory 
arbitrage. In addition, these are banks that are more important for the stability of the system as a 
whole.  
The empirical model 
We estimate various version of the following basic equation: 
 
( 1 ) 
where yijt is the change in the bank’s stock returns stock price between the end of quarter t-1 and 
the end of quarter t, the α’s, β’s, and γ’s are coefficients to be estimated, djt is a matrix of 
country/time dummy variables, kijt-1 is bank capital, the variables we are mostly interested in, Xijt-
1 is a matrix of bank-level control variables, dcrisis is a dummy variable for quarters during which 
the financial crisis was unfolding, and uijt is a disturbance term.
5 Through the interaction term 
with the crisis dummy we allow the effect of the various explanatory variables on stock returns 
to differ during the crisis period. The crisis phase extends from the third quarter of 2007 through 
the first quarter of 2009. The pre-crisis period includes 2006 and the first half of 2007. In one of 
the robustness tests, we estimate a specification where a separate crisis period is identified as the 
period following the Lehman default (Q3.2008-Q1.2009).  
The model is estimated with OLS, and standard errors are clustered at the bank level to take into 
account possible autocorrelation in the residuals. In robustness test, we check whether clustering 
                                                 
4 Only two banks in our sample were closed down during our sample period (both of them U.S. banks), so attrition 
bias should not be a serious concern.  
5 For a similar empirical model relating stock returns during the financial crisis to firm characteristics, see Tong and 
Wei (forthcoming).  
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at the country level or by time changes the standard errors substantially, and conclude that it does 
not.
6 
Overview of the data 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the distribution of stock returns during the sample period 
for the full sample and for the sample of larger banks. Average quarterly stock returns are also 
plotted in Figure 1 for each of the countries in the sample. Median quarterly stock returns are 
positive in the pre-crisis period and, as expected, become negative in the third quarter of 2007, 
with a median quarterly decline of 2.6 percent in the full sample and 3.5 percent in the sample of 
larger banks. Returns are also much more dispersed during the crisis than in tranquil times, with 
the standard deviation more than doubling. The post-Lehman quarters show even more negative 
stock returns and somewhat higher dispersion.  
The main variable of interest is bank capital. As discussed in the introduction, we use a number 
of alternative definitions of capitals: (1) the risk-adjusted regulatory capital ratio, calculated 
according to Basel rules. This is calculated as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital divided by 
risk-adjusted assets and off-balance sheet exposures; (2) the Tier 1 regulatory ratio, which is 
excludes Tier 2 capital from the numerator; (3) the leverage ratio (defined as regulatory capital 
divided by total assets), the Tier 1 ratio and Tier 2 ratio; and the common equity ratio (defined as 
shareholder funds). Tier 1 capital comprises shareholder funds and perpetual, non-cumulative 
preference shares. Tier 2 capital comprises hybrid capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves, 
and valuation reserves. In the debate following the crisis, questions about the ability of the risk-
adjustment used in the Basel framework to capture bank risk have been raised. Also, the 
increased reliance by banks (especially large banks) on lower quality capital such as non-tangible 
equity and Tier 2 capital has been criticized because this type of capital cannot be used to offset 
losses in times of distress.
7  
Table 2 shows summary statistics on bank capitalization in our samples. For the full sample, the 
median risk-adjusted capital asset ratio was 11.9 percent, comfortably above the minimum Basel 
requirement of 8 percent, with a standard deviation of 2.8 percent. The median Tier 1 capital was 
a seemingly healthy 9.7 percent. The median leverage ratio was quite a bit lower, 7.8 percent, 
and the common equity ratio scaled by assets was just 6.2 percent. Interestingly, larger banks had 
lower capital than the full sample as measured by the common equity ratio (a median of just 4.1 
percent), the leverage ratio (a median of 6.5 percent), or the Tier1 risk-adjusted ratio (8.2 
percent). The standard Basel capital ratio, on the other hand, barely differed between the two 
groups of banks. Thus, larger banks were relying more heavily on lower quality capital and had 
larger “risk-adjustments” of assets than smaller banks.  
                                                 
6 See Petersen (2009) for a study of alternative standard errors in finance datasets. 
7  See for example, Viñals et al. (2010). Also, the stress tests conducted by the U.S. authorities in May 2009 put 
much emphasis on the common equity cushion. 7 
 
Turning now to the control variables in the regressions, country/year dummy variables control 
for any possible omitted effect that operates at the country level, such as macroeconomic shocks, 
the systemic component of the shock to bank equity prices, the policy response to the crisis, 
differences in accounting and regulatory definition of capital across countries and so on. In other 
words, what our model seeks to explain is just the cross-sectional, within-country dispersion in 
stock returns in each quarter.  
To isolate the effect of capital on this dispersion, we control for other bank-specific 
characteristics that may affect stock returns. Specifically, we control for bank liquidity using 
liquid assets/assets; the bank’s reliance on deposits for funding (deposits/total assets), asset 
quality (loans loss provisions), the banks’ business model (net loans/assets), and the bank size 
(log of total assets). Also, following standard asset pricing models, we include in the regression 
the stock’s beta (computed as the five-year covariance between the bank’s monthly stock return 
and the country stock market return) and the market-to-book value of equity.
8 The price-earnings 
ratio (PE) measure possible mispricing of bank equity during the boom. Summary statistics for 
the explanatory variables are in the Appendix, Table A2. 
Explanatory variables computed from bank balance sheet information, including the variables 
measuring bank capital, are available on a yearly basis rather than a quarterly basis, while our 
dependent variable is quarterly. For these variables, we use the last available (but not 
contemporaneous) observation. For example, stock returns during each of the four quarters of 
2007 are regressed on the capital/asset ratio at the end of 2006.     
In Table 3 we report correlations among stock returns, the various (lagged) capital ratios, and the 
other explanatory variables. Interestingly, there is a strong negative correlation between capital 
and bank size, particularly the Tier 1 leverage ratio. The regulatory ratio (RWR) and the leverage 
ratio (LR) have a correlation of 63 percent in the full sample and of only 31 percent in the large 
bank sample. In general, correlations among the various notions of capital tend to be lower for 
the sample of larger banks.  
III.   THE RESULTS 
Results from the baseline model 
Table 4 contains the estimation results for the baseline model for the full sample and the sample 
of larger banks. The model allows the coefficient of all explanatory variables to differ among the 
pre-crisis and the crisis period, and the table also reports tests for the equality of the crisis and 
pre-crisis coefficients.  
Before the crisis, several of the explanatory variables appeared to significantly affect stock 
returns: banks with lower loan loss provisions, a higher market-to-book ratio, and a lower P/E 
                                                 
8 For a discussion of why it is desirable to include these variables directly in the regressions as firm characteristics 
rather than going through a factor model, see Tong and Wei (forthcoming) and Whited and Wu (2006). 8 
 
ratio had higher stock returns. Also, among large banks more liquidity was associated with 
higher returns. As for capital, there is some evidence that higher capital (measured by the 
leverage ratio) resulted in higher stock returns in the full sample, but the coefficient is small and 
the statistical significance marginal.  
During the crisis, the relationship between stock returns and bank characteristics changes 
markedly. More reliance on deposit funding is rewarded by the stock market, not surprisingly 
given the disruptions in wholesale funding markets throughout the crisis. On the other hand, the 
standard liquidity ratio has a negative and significant coefficient in one specification. Perhaps 
this reflects the fact that larger liquid assets might have been associated with larger holdings of 
mortgage-backed securities that were at the center of the asset quality deterioration and quickly 
became illiquid once the crisis started (Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 2009). Also, 
liquidity during a crisis may proxy the extent of liquidity support by the Central Bank, a signal of 
trouble. The coefficient of loan loss provisions becomes much larger in the full sample, although 
it remains insignificant for the larger banks. The market-to-book ratio is no longer significant in 
the full sample.  
Turning to capital, the Basel ratio is positive and (marginally) significant in the full sample 
during the crisis. Based on our estimates, an increase in this ratio by one percentage point 
increases quarterly stock returns by 11 basis points, a relatively small effect. The leverage ratio is 
not significant in the full sample. Among the largest banks, on the other hand, the leverage ratio 
has a positive and strongly significant coefficient in the crisis while the Basel ratio is 
insignificant. As to the magnitude of the effect, for the large banks increasing the leverage ratio 
by one percentage point would have resulted in an additional 55 basis points in stock returns per 
quarter, or 12 percent of the median quarterly decline of 4.7 percent.  
The finding that the leverage ratio is significant while the regulatory ratio is not may suggest that 
market participants did not view the risk-adjustment under Basel as informative in capturing the 
true risk in bank portfolios during the crisis, at least among larger banks. This also suggests that 
the differences in stock returns among large banks with different capital levels did not just reflect 
expectations about actions by regulators (such as decisions to close or merge undercapitalized 
banks, or demand additional capital), as such decisions would presumably have been taken on 
the basis of shortfalls in regulatory capital. Rather, capital mattered because of its ability to 
absorb losses as well as its possible role as a signal of bank asset quality. 
When we split capital into Tier 1 and Tier 2 (Table 5), it is Tier1 leverage that remains 
significant, suggesting that market participants focused more on the component of capital that is 
available to absorb losses while the bank continues as a going concern.
9 In the last four columns 
of Table 5 we split capital between common equity and other components, a somewhat different 
decomposition. When we do this, we find that differences in the common equity ratio, whether 
risk-adjusted or not, are significant in explaining returns during the crisis, but not before the 
                                                 
9 Since Tier 2 capital consists of subordinated debt, loss absorption implies default.  9 
 
crisis. The magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the large bank sample and for the non risk-
adjusted ratio, consistent with the other results. For large banks, however, also “other capital” is 
significant, with a coefficient not far from that of common equity, suggesting that stock market 
investors did not differentiate between these two types of capital.  
To summarize, we find evidence that during the crisis stock market investors placed higher value 
on better capitalized banks, while they did not do so before the crisis. The evidence is 
particularly strong for the leverage ratio in the sample of large banks. Differences in the Basel 
ratio do not explain differences in crisis stock returns for this group of banks, while they have 
limited explanatory power in the full sample.  
To gain a better understanding of the timing of the effects under consideration, we have 
estimated our empirical model separately for each quarter, and plotted the estimated regression 
coefficients of capital and their 10 percent confidence interval in Figure 2. We do this exercise 
for the two concepts of capital (regulatory ratio and leverage ratio) and for the two samples (full 
sample and large banks only). The charts show that the “sensitivity” of stock returns to bank 
capital was negligible before the crisis, and it became stronger as the crisis progressed, until the 
third quarter of 2008. The strongest effect is for the leverage ratio during the period Q4.2007-
Q2.2008 in the sample of large banks.   
Robustness tests 
In our benchmark specification we identify large banks based on total assets. However, because 
of the growing securitization business, bank loans and deposits may be increasingly inaccurate 
measure of bank activities. An alternative proxy for bank size is total operating income (interest 
income plus non-interest income). In the regressions in Table 6, we define as large banks those 
with operating income above U.S. $1 billion (top 20
th percentile) and re-estimate the baseline 
model. The results remain stronger for leverage ratio and for the Tier 1 ratio, consistent with the 
baseline regressions.  
In Table 7 we estimate a slightly different version of the baseline regressions as an additional 
robustness test. Instead of doing the estimation for the full sample period and two separate 
samples (all banks and large banks), we estimate the model separately for the pre-crisis and the 
crisis period, and interact the coefficients of the explanatory variables with a large-bank dummy 
and a small-bank dummy (with the dummy switching value for banks with asset size above $50 
billion). In an additional exercise, we run a regression for the period following the Lehman 
bankruptcy only, to test whether the effect of capital on stock returns differed during the most 
acute phase of the financial crisis. The results tend to confirm our earlier findings: capital 
becomes more important during the crisis, and the strongest effect is that of the Tier 1 leverage 
ratio on stock returns of large banks. During the post-Lehman quarter, the coefficient of Tier 1 
leverage for large banks is larger than in the full crisis period, suggesting that capital was 
affecting stock returns particularly strongly during this period.  
In Table 8 we estimate the baseline regression using alternative estimation techniques. In the first 
four columns, we use weighted least squares to address possible problems with the sample 10 
 
composition being uneven. The coefficients are very similar to the OLS coefficients. However, 
the standard errors do change a bit, and now the coefficients of Tier 1 capital (both the Basel 
ratio and the leverage ratio) during the crisis are significantly positive for the full sample. For 
large banks, as in the baseline it is only the Tier 1 leverage ratio that is significant. In the second 
part of the table, we show standard errors clustered by country rather than bank. Clustering by 
the higher level of aggregation is generally preferable (Cameron et al., 2006), but it can give rise 
to distortions if the number of clusters is small and the cluster size is uneven, as is the case with 
our sample (Nichols and Shaffer, 2007). The results are very similar to those obtained through 
weighted least square estimation. Finally, in the third part of the table we cluster the standard 
errors by quarter. Again, we find that the baseline results are not much changed, the main 
difference is that now the leverage ratio in crisis is significant also for the full sample.
10 
Finally, we estimate a specification with a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a bank 
has been recapitalized with government funds in a given quarter (Table 9). To identify banks that 
received public funds we used several sources including press articles, official documents posted 
online, and information from central banks’ Financial Stability Report, and Treasury websites. In 
some countries (e.g. the U.K.) the plans were targeted to systemically important institutions, 
while in others (e.g. the U.S.) all banks were allowed to participate provided they fulfilled certain 
criteria. All in all, we identify 95 banks that were recapitalized in the full sample, of which 25 
also belong to the sample of larger banks. While, the recapitalization dummy is negative and 
significant, indicating that stock returns for the recapitalized banks were particularly low in the 
quarter in which recapitalization occurred, the relationship between capital and stock returns 
does not change relative to the baseline.
11  
To summarize, we find robust evidence that differences in the Tier 1 leverage ratio help explain 
differences in stock returns during the financial crisis in a sample of large banks. For a broader 
sample including all listed banks with available information, the results are more mixed: there is 
some evidence that capital mattered during the crisis, but the evidence is not robust, and it does 
not look like the market was clearly differentiating between the regulatory ratio and the leverage 
ratio. 
Why does capital affect stock returns only among large banks? 
These results raise the question of why the leverage ratio matters for equity prices especially in 
the sample of larger banks. One possible interpretation is that larger banks with complex 
operations have more opportunities to take advantage of “regulatory arbitrage” opportunities and 
distort the risk exposure measure used by regulators to compute capital adequacy. Also, capital’s 
                                                 
10 Using a dataset of monthly U.S. stock prices and balance sheet variables from Daniel and Titman (2008), Petersen 
(2009) finds that standard errors clustered by time are much larger than standard errors clustered by firm, and 
recommends clustering by time. In our dataset, there appears to be little difference. Petersen also points out that 
clustering by time is similar to using the Fama-Macbeth regressions.     
11 The negative coefficient of the recapitalization dummy may indicate that recapitalization diluted shareholders or 
that it signaled bad news about the future profitability of the bank. 11 
 
role as a signal of a bank’s exposure to toxic assets may have been more important in the case of 
large banks, whose balance sheets are more opaque than those of small banks.  
Another interpretation is based on the Calem-Rob model. If we measure capitalization based on 
“high quality” capital such as the Tier1 ratio or the common equity ratio, the larger banks in our 
sample were less well capitalized than the smaller banks, as pointed out in the previous section.
12 
The Calem-Rob model predicts that, at low levels of capitalization, bank risk-taking is a 
decreasing function of capital, while for strongly capitalized banks the relationship has the 
opposite sign. If we take the size of the decline in stock prices during the crisis as a measure of 
the market’s view of how much risk a bank had taken during the good times, then the Caleb-Rob 
model would predict a positive relationship between capital and stock returns for less well 
capitalized banks but not for better capitalized banks, which is what we find.  
To explore this interpretation further, in Table 10 we rerun the baseline regressions splitting the 
sample based on the level of capitalization at the end of 2006. Interestingly, for banks with 
capital above the median, higher capital did not translate into better stock performance during the 
crisis. On the other hand, for less well capitalized banks higher capital did result in a higher stock 
returns during the crisis. For this sample split, we do not see a distinction between the Basel ratio 
and the leverage ratio or between Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. All in all, these findings are 
consistent with the implications of the Caleb-Rob model, namely that a negative relationship 
between risk and capital should appear only for weakly capitalized banks.  
IV.   CDS SPREADS AND BANK CAPITAL 
As an alternative measure of bank performance, we also examine the premium on the 5-year 
senior tranche MR credit default swap (CDS) (the most liquid) from MarKit. CDS spreads are 
widely used as indicators of default risk in pricing other securities, such as bonds or even equity 
(European Central Bank, 2009). While CDS spreads have the advantage that they capture 
expected losses to bank creditors rather than just shareholders, relying on CDS spreads results in 
a much smaller sample of banks: there are only 33 internationally active banks which are also 
covered by Bankscope for which CDS spreads are available. Additional data requirements 
restrict the sample to less than 30 banks. The sample period is the same as for stock returns, 
namely Q1.2006-Q1.2009.  Another potential drawback of using CDS spreads as indicators of 
bank performance is that the market was disrupted during the financial crisis, especially after the 
Lehman bankruptcy, potentially hampering the information content of the spreads (European 
Central Bank, 2009).
13  
                                                 
12 For instance, the median common equity ratio is 6.2 percent in the full sample but only 4.1 percent in the large 
bank sample.  
13 The notional amounts of CDS contracts fell by 25 per cent between June and December 2008, as concerns about 
counterparty risk grew. Hart and Zingales (2009) argues that CDS contracts should be traded on an exchange where 
the counterparty risk can be minimized, and the positions of the various parties are transparently disclosed. 12 
 
Summary statistics for the CDS sample are in the Appendix, Table A2. The characteristics of 
these banks are quite similar to those of the large bank sample of the previous sections. The 
median change in the CDS spread over the pre-crisis period was minus six basis points, while 
during the crisis period the median increase was 167 basis points. The increase in the spread was 
even more pronounced in the quarters after the Lehman bankruptcy (246 basis points). As in the 
case of stock returns, the dispersion of spread changes also increased sharply during the crisis.  
The empirical model is similar to that used to explain corporate CDS spreads by Ericsson, 
Jacobs, and Oviedo (2009), which is in turn inspired by the corporate bond spread models of 
Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Cremer, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2004). In a 
simple linear regression framework, changes in the CDS spread are regressed on changes in the 
bank’s leverage, defined as the book value of the bank’s debt divided by the sum of the book 
value of debt plus the book value of equity), the change in stock price volatility, and changes in 
the yield on the risk-free asset.
14 According to the theory, an increase in the default probability 
(an increase in the CDS premium) should be increasing in the bank’s leverage and in the 
variability of its expected future cash flows (proxied by equity volatility), and it should be 
decreasing in the risk-free interest rate.  Since we are interested in the role of capital, we add to 
these three variables various lagged measures of bank capital, as in the previous sections. We 
also allow the coefficients of the capital ratios to differ between crisis and non-crisis periods. 
Finally, in these regressions we control for region/time fixed effects rather than country/time 
fixed effects because we do not have a sufficiently large number of banks per country. Of course, 
we expected better capitalized banks to experience a smaller increase in the CDS premium 
during the crisis than weakly capitalized banks. 
The regression results are in Table 11. The risk-free interest rate and leverage are significant with 
the expected sign, while volatility of equity has the right sign but is not significant. However, 
higher bank capital does not seem to lead to a smaller increase in the CDS spread during the 
crisis: the coefficient of Tier 1 capital does turn from positive to negative as the crisis begins, but 
it is not significantly different from zero. Somewhat oddly, Tier 2 capital has a positive and 
(marginally) significant coefficient in the regression in which assets are not risk-adjusted. One 
potential reason for these results may be the small sample size and the lack of liquidity of the 
CDS market following the Lehman bankruptcy. However, when we estimate separate 
coefficients for the post-Lehman period, we do continue to find no significant results for capital.   
                                                 
14 The bank’s leverage (ratio of debt to assets) should not be confused with its leverage ratio (ratio of book capital to 
assets).   13 
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
The global financial crisis has led to widespread calls to reform bank regulation and supervision. 
Changes in bank capital regulation have been at the heart of the resulting policy discussions led 
by global banking regulators. In redesigning prudential standards to incorporate lessons from the 
recent turmoil, the Basel committee of supervisors has grappled with two important questions in 
particular: what type of capital should banks hold to ensure that they can better withstand periods 
of economic and financial stress? And should a simple leverage ratio be introduced to reduce 
regulatory arbitrage and improve transparency? 
Our paper sheds light on both of these questions by investigating whether banks’ stock returns 
were affected differently depending on whether banks entered the financial crisis with a better 
capital position. Specifically, we use a quarterly panel of bank data for 12 countries for 2006-
2009 to study the impact of bank capital and its different definitions and components on changes 
in market valuation of banks. Using the crisis period that started in August 2007 as an 
unexpected negative shock, we explore whether market participants perceive different capital 
definitions to be effective measures of banks’ ability to withstand stress. 
We find that before the crisis, differences in initial capital – whether risk-adjusted or not, 
however defined – did not consistently affect subsequent bank stock returns. The effect becomes 
evident only during the crisis period, and even then it is significant and robust just for the largest 
banks in our sample. This is consistent with the implication that a negative relationship between 
risk and capital should be stronger for undercapitalized banks, which is the case for larger banks 
in our sample. Our results also suggest that during the crisis stock returns of large and 
undercapitalized banks were much more sensitive to leverage ratios as opposed to risk-adjusted 
capital ratios. This may be because market participants viewed risk- adjusted ratios as much less 
informative given they were more easily subject to manipulation and therefore less transparent. 
Finally, the positive association with subsequent stock returns is stronger for higher quality 
capital (Tier 1 leverage and common equity), but these findings are not as robust across different 
specifications.  
Our findings have potential policy implications for the on-going process of regulatory reform. 
First, for undercapitalized and larger banks, we find better capitalization is associated with 
greater resilience in dealing with shocks, consistent with the spirit of capital regulation.  Second, 
our results provide support for introducing a leverage ratio as a way to strengthen bank 
capitalization, as properly measuring risk exposure is very difficult especially for large and 
complex financial organizations. Finally, our tests provide some support to the view that greater 
emphasis on Tier 1 capital and common equity is likely to be effective.  14 
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Table 1. Bank Stock Returns Before and During the Crisis  
In this table we report descriptive statistics of stock returns for three sample periods: (1) the pre-crisis period Q1/2006 to Q2/2007; (2) the crisis 
period Q3/2007 to Q1/2009; (3) and the period following Lehman bankruptcy Q3/2008 to Q1/2009. In the first column we also report the minimum 
and maximum number of banks per year reporting relevant variables in our sample. Stock returns are obtained from Datastream. The summary 
statistics are reported for all banks in our sample and large banks. Large banks are defined as banks with total assets above $50 billion (the 20th 






No. of Observ.  Mean Std. Dev.  25th percentile  50th percentile  75th percentile  95th percentile
Full sample 
Stock return pre-crisis Q1-2006 to Q2-2007 1875 0.4 3.6 -1.6 0.3 2.2 6.1
Stock return crisis Q3/2007-Q1/2009 2344 -3.5 7.8 -6.7 -2.6 0.8 6.8
Stock return post-Lehman Q3/2008-Q1/2009 1013 -5.3 9.8 -10.0 -4.8 0.4 8.9
Large banks sample 
Stock return pre-crisis Q1-2006 to Q2-2007 340 0.8 3.0 -1.2 0.8 2.4 6.0
Stock return crisis Q3/2007-Q1/2009 480 -4.7 8.0 -8.0 -3.5 0.0 6.7
Stock return post-Lehman Q3/2008-Q1/2009 211 -6.7 10.3 -11.6 -5.8 -1.0 8.717 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics: Capital Ratios 
Banks in our sample operate in 12 different OECD countries (see Table A1 for the list of countries and distribution of banks across countries).  The 
sample period for the measures of capital (lagged one period in the regression) is 2005 to 2008. The yearly data are obtained from Bankscope.  RWRt 
is the total capital adequacy ratio under the Basle rules. It measures regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets and off balance sheet risks. 
RWRt1 is the Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio, defined as shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-cumulative preference shares plus retained earnings, 
as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off balance sheet risks measured under Basel rules. RWRt2 is the Tier 2 capital ratio, defined as 
subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves divided by risk-weighted assets and off balance sheet risks measured 
under Basle rules.  LRt is the leverage ratio defined as regulatory capital divided by total assets. LRt1 is the Tier 1 leverage ratio and LRt2 is the Tier 
2 leverage ratio. Common equity is shareholder funds, and other capital is regulatory capital minus common equity scaled either by risk-weighted 
assets (RWA) or un-weighted total assets (TA). Summary statistics are reported for the whole sample and the sample of large banks. Large banks are 




No. of Observ.  Mean Std. Dev.  25th percentile  50th percentile  75th percentile  95th percentile
Whole sample 
RWRt  4254 12.6 2.8 10.7 11.9 13.7 19.5
RWRt1  4073 10.2 2.8 8.1 9.7 11.6 16.5
RWRt2  4049 2.3 1.5 1.2 2.4 3.1 4.9
LRt 3779 8.1 2.5 5.9 7.8 9.8 13.0
LRt1 3814 6.7 2.4 4.7 6.3 8.3 11.4
LRt2 3726 1.4 1.1 0.7 1.3 1.9 3.4
Common equity/RWA 3655 9.6 5.5 6.3 9.1 11.9 19.5
Common equity/TA 5381 7.1 4.5 3.8 6.2 9.5 16.8
Other capital/RWA 3654 1.2 3.3 -0.6 0.2 2.2 8.6
Other capital/TA 3700 0.8 2.3 -0.4 0.1 1.4 6.0
Large banks sample 
RWRt  887 12.2 2.4 10.6 11.7 13.1 19.5
RWRt1  827 8.6 1.9 7.2 8.2 9.5 12.7
RWRt2  827 3.2 1.5 2.7 3.3 4.0 5.2
LRt 741 7.2 2.2 5.4 6.5 8.5 12.4
LRt1 769 5.1 1.7 3.7 4.6 6.0 8.8
LRt2 736 2.0 1.0 1.3 1.9 2.8 3.8
Common equity/RWA 745 7.2 3.9 3.4 7.2 10.5 13.4
Common equity/TA 973 4.8 3.3 1.9 4.1 7.5 10.7
Other capital/RWA 745 1.4 3.3 -1.1 0.8 3.5 7.3
Other capital/TA 748 0.7 2.0 -0.6 0.5 1.9 4.318 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the whole sample of banks and the sample of large banks. Large banks are defined as banks 
with total assets above 50 billion US $. See Table 2 for the definition of all capital ratios. RWA is risk-weighted assets and TA is total (un-weighted) 
assets. The balance-sheet data are all obtained from Bankscope and the market data (stock returns, price-earnings ratio, Beta, market to book value of 





All banks  



























Stock return % 1
RWRt 0.0378* 1
RWRt1 0.0534* 0.8341* 1
RWRt2 -0.0370* 0.1893* -0.3838* 1
LRt -0.0196 0.6268* 0.5231* 0.1465* 1
LRt1 -0.0054 0.6639* 0.7112* -0.1681* 0.9093* 1
LRt2 -0.0274 0.0421* -0.3592* 0.7090* 0.3204* -0.1029* 1
Common equity/RWA 0.0597* 0.5513* 0.6451* -0.2311* 0.4498* 0.5567* -0.1663* 1
Common equity/TA 0.0293* 0.4303* 0.5608* -0.1812* 0.6470* 0.7081* -0.0380* 0.9130* 1
Other capita/RWA -0.0326* 0.1540* 0.0577* 0.1540* 0.0456* 0.0360* 0.0094 -0.5563* -0.5435* 1
Other capital /TA -0.0385* 0.1474* 0.0562* 0.1457* 0.0947* 0.0977* -0.0056 -0.5565* -0.5335* 0.9712* 1
Market to book value of equity (PB) -0.0047 0.0311* 0.0154 0.029 0.0607* 0.0404* 0.0469* 0.0404* 0.0483* -0.0838* -0.0795* 1
Price-earnings ratio (PE) -0.0111 -0.0038 -0.0146 0.021 -0.029 -0.0317 0.0056 -0.0043 0.0177 -0.0062 -0.0098 0.0028 1
Beta -0.0606* 0.0185 -0.1357* 0.2337* -0.2023* -0.2678* 0.1059* -0.1812* -0.1310* 0.1125* 0.0703* 0.0463* 0.0351* 1
Loan Loss Provisions/TA -0.1112* -0.1235* -0.2441* 0.0940* -0.0745* -0.1119* 0.0974* -0.1594* -0.0793* -0.01 0.0235 0.007 0.0268* 0.1792* 1
Liquid Assets/TA 0.014 0.1719* 0.0909* 0.1469* 0.2804* 0.1867* 0.1729* -0.0522* -0.0229 0.2362* 0.2142* 0.0750* -0.0148 0.1288* -0.0677* 1
Total Deposits/TA  0.0464* -0.2415* -0.1261* -0.2012* -0.1567* -0.0638* -0.1555* 0.0282 -0.0764* -0.2041* -0.1589* -0.0614* 0.018 -0.1909* 0.0082 -0.1610* 1
Net Loans/TA  -0.0629* -0.2201* -0.1188* -0.1396* 0.2290* 0.2709* -0.0242 0.0458* 0.0849* -0.1366* -0.0568* -0.0646* -0.0258 -0.1826* 0.1449* -0.3534* 0.3252* 1
log(TA) -0.0338* -0.3106* -0.5017* 0.2439* -0.5538* -0.6842* 0.2095* -0.4060* -0.5255* 0.0276 -0.0298 0.0131 -0.0027 0.1539* 0.1392* -0.0297* -0.1593* -0.3180* 1
(*) denotes statistical significance at the 5 % level and above.19 
 
Table 3. (…), continued  
Large banks



























Stock return % 1
RWRt 0.0442 1
RWRt1 0.0483 0.6588* 1
RWRt2 -0.027 0.2927* -0.5265* 1
LRt -0.0117 0.3123* 0.0434 0.3085* 1
LRt1 -0.005 0.4011* 0.3336* 0.0268 0.9109* 1
LRt2 -0.0384 0.0927* -0.4593* 0.6647* 0.6985* 0.3410* 1
Common equity/RWA 0.0623 0.1316* 0.3210* -0.2533* 0.3251* 0.4591* -0.0246 1
Common equity/TA -0.0133 0.1165* 0.1883* -0.0606 0.6145* 0.6493* 0.2957* 0.9017* 1
Other capita/RWA -0.0417 0.2206* 0.027 0.2068* -0.0913* -0.1134* -0.0287 -0.7976* -0.7138* 1
Other capital /TA -0.0475 0.2508* 0.0753* 0.1800* -0.0302 -0.0299 -0.029 -0.7723* -0.7029* 0.9708* 1
Market to book value of equity (PB) -0.0056 0.043 0.0023 0.0563 0.0394 0.0204 0.058 0.1015* 0.0955* -0.2516* -0.2309* 1
Price-earnings ratio (PE) -0.0358 -0.0066 -0.0244 0.0216 -0.0213 -0.0275 0.0057 -0.0371 -0.0339 0.0268 0.0244 0.0013 1
Beta -0.1058* 0.1504* -0.1211* 0.3455* -0.1780* -0.2731* 0.0675 -0.4276* -0.1655* 0.3881* 0.3689* -0.0776* 0.0608 1
Loan Loss Provisions/TA -0.1585* 0.2044* -0.0739* 0.1611* 0.2807* 0.2369* 0.2779* -0.0255 0.2755* 0.0725* 0.0754* 0.1139* -0.0104 0.0679* 1
Liquid Assets/TA 0.1070* -0.1292* -0.1352* 0.0218 -0.3938* -0.4003* -0.2712* -0.2894* -0.3957* 0.0889* 0.0693 0.03 -0.019 0.0468 -0.1800* 1
Total Deposits/TA  0.0799* 0.0291 0.1210* -0.1992* -0.0348 0.0895* -0.1277* 0.2365* 0.1097* -0.1043* -0.1027* -0.2143* 0.0257 -0.2423* -0.0786* -0.4410* 1
Net Loans/TA  -0.0717* -0.0955* -0.1968* 0.1115* 0.4807* 0.4764* 0.3292* 0.2174* 0.3680* -0.07 -0.0487 -0.1001* -0.0092 -0.2303* 0.2681* -0.5965* 0.5380* 1
log(TA) -0.0511 -0.3073* -0.0629 -0.0085 -0.2613* -0.3192* -0.0812* -0.0745* -0.0956* -0.0256 -0.0996* -0.0096 0.0227 0.1644* -0.1264* 0.3786* -0.3830* -0.3750* 1
(*) denotes statistical significance at the 5 % level and above.20 
 
Table 4. Stock market performance and bank capital over the financial cycle 




where yijt is the bank’s stock returns in quarter t, the α’s, β’s, and γ’s are coefficients to be estimated, djt is a matrix of country*time 
dummy variables, kijt-1 is bank capital, the variables we are mostly interested in, Xijt-1 is a matrix of bank-level control variables, dcrisis 
is a dummy variable for quarters during which the financial crisis was unfolding, and uijt is a disturbance term. The sample period for 
the stock return is Q1-2006 to Q1-2009. Crisis is a dummy that takes value one from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009. Capital is measured either 
as total regulatory capital (Tier1+Tier2) scaled by Basel risk-weighted assets (RWR) or total regulatory capital scaled by total un-
weighted assets (leverage ratio, LR).  See Table A2 for a detailed definition of the control variables. Liquidity stands for liquid assets , 
deposits for total deposits (including demand and saving deposits), provisions for loan loss provisions, and size is the logarithm of 
total assets. Liquidity, deposits, net loans, and loan loss provisions are all in percentage of total assets. PB stands for market to book 
value of equity and PE for price-earnings ratio. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. We report estimates for the whole 
sample and the sample of large banks. Large banks are defined as banks with total assets above $50 billion. We report standard errors 








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole sample  Large banks 
R W RL RR W RL R
Pre-crisis period:
Capital*PreCrisis 0.023 0.078* -0.155 -0.046
[0.036] [0.046] [0.102] [0.089]
Liquidity*PreCrisis 0.016* 0.012 0.047** 0.041
[0.008] [0.010] [0.022] [0.026]
Deposits*PreCrisis 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.014
[0.009] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013]
Net Loans*PreCrisis 0.001 -0.001 -0.020* -0.012
[0.007] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012]
Provisions*PreCrisis -1.204*** -1.043** -1.333* -1.402
[0.374] [0.428] [0.760] [0.886]
Size*PreCrisis 0.053 0.07 -0.698 -0.209
[0.070] [0.078] [0.839] [0.736]
PB*PreCrisis 0.018*** 0.015** 0.108 0.093
[0.005] [0.006] [0.072] [0.075]
PE*PreCrisis 0.000 -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003]
Beta*PreCrisis -0.233 -0.082 -0.239 -0.338
[0.242] [0.257] [0.293] [0.349]
ijt  ijt  crisis ijt crisis ijt ijt 
jt 
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Table 4. (…), continued 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis period:
Capital*Crisis 0.114* 0.124 0.207 0.553***
[0.063] [0.096] [0.143] [0.194]
(0.079) (0.597) (0.004) (0.002)
Liquidity*Crisis -0.037** -0.037 0.098* 0.094
[0.017] [0.022] [0.056] [0.066]
(0.002) (0.015) (0.308) (0.334)
Deposits*Crisis 0.036** 0.038* 0.074*** 0.102***
[0.016] [0.020] [0.022] [0.030]
(0.125) (0.180) (0.022) (0.011)
Net Loans*Crisis -0.030* -0.031* -0.032 -0.073**
[0.016] [0.018] [0.028] [0.028]
(0.020) (0.080) (0.694) (0.043)
Provisions*Crisis -3.014*** -3.644*** -2.947 -2.927
[0.995] [1.076] [2.373] [3.246]
(0.068) (0.017) (0.497) (0.637)
Size*Crisis -0.038 0.043 -1.265 -0.73
[0.088] [0.090] [0.830] [0.730]
(0.180) (0.691) (0.005) (0.010)
PB*Crisis 0.027 0.006 0.043 0.024
[0.064] [0.062] [0.070] [0.042]
(0.885) (0.893) (0.582) (0.465)
PE*Crisis -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(0.267) (0.837) (0.015) (0.008)
Beta*Crisis -0.594* -0.754** -0.105 0.014
[0.350] [0.358] [0.506] [0.658]
(0.333) (0.084) (0.800) (0.585)
Country*Year FE x x x x
Nber. Obser. 4254 3779 887 741
R squared 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.32
Note: (*), (**) and (***) stand for statistically significant at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Robust standard errors
clustered by bank reported in brackets. In parentheses we report the pvalue for the test of equality of effects during crisis
and pre-crisis.
Whole sample  Large banks 
R W RL RR W RL R22 
 
Table 5. Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital and common equity 
The dependent variable is the quarterly stock return. See Table 4 for a detailed description of the estimated model.  The sample period for the stock return is Q1-2006 to Q1-2009. 
All control variables are lagged one year. Crisis is  a dummy variable that takes value one from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009. Tier1 (Tier2) is Tier1 (Tier2) capital scaled either by risk-
weighted assets (RWR) or total un-weighted assets (LR).  Tier1 capital includes shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-cumulative preference shares, plus retained earnings. Tier2 
capital includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves.  Common equity is shareholders fund and other capital total regulatory capital minus 
common equity. We report estimates for the whole sample and the sample of large banks. Large banks are defined as banks with total assets above 50 billion US $. Standard errors 
clustered by bank  are reported in brackets and the p-value for the test of significant difference between the pre-crisis and crisis coefficients in parentheses.  
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RWR LR RWR LR RWR LR RWR LR
Tier1*PreCrisis 0.024 0.110* -0.092 0.061
[0.046] [0.061] [0.129] [0.149]
Tier2*PreCrisis 0.074 0.006 -0.106 -0.252
[0.055] [0.072] [0.145] [0.178]
Tier1*Crisis 0.117 0.154 0.264 0.603***
[0.080] [0.108] [0.186] [0.210]
(0.120) (0.623) (0.041) (0.003)
Tier2*Crisis 0.051 0.058 0.131 0.415
[0.098] [0.188] [0.257] [0.350]
(0.809) (0.810) (0.369) (0.115)
Common equity*PreCrisis 0.015 0.048 -0.005 -0.003
[0.018] [0.034] [0.089] [0.143]
Other capital*PreCrisis -0.097*** -0.079 -0.053 -0.214*
[0.034] [0.059] [0.083] [0.112]
Common equity*Crisis 0.114** 0.165** 0.283** 0.617**
[0.044] [0.067] [0.126] [0.278]
(0.047) (0.014) (0.012) (0.035)
Other capital*Crisis -0.015 0.002 0.324** 0.561*
[0.076] [0.102] [0.144] [0.293]
(0.407) (0.251) (0.008) (0.015)
Controls*Crisis x x x x x x x x
Controls*PreCrisis x x x x x x x x
Country*Year FE xx
Nber. Obser. 4049 3726 827 736 3654 3700 745 748
R squared 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.32
Note: (*), (**) and (***) stand for statistically significant at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Robust standard errors
Whole sample  Whole sample   Large banks   Large banks 23 
 
 
Table 6. Stock market performance and structure of bank capital over the financial cycle: Alternative definitions of large bank 
 
The dependent variable is the quarterly stock return.  See Table 4 for a detailed description of the estimated model.  In this table we report results  for 
a group of large banks defined as banks with operating income above 1 billion US $. The sample period for the stock return is Q1-2006 to Q1-2009. 
All control variables are lagged one year.  Crisis is  a dummy that takes value one  from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009. Tier1 (Tier2) is Tier1 (Tier2) capital 
scaled either by risk-weighted assets (RWR) or total un-weighted assets (LR).  Tier1 capital includes shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-
cumulative preference shares, plus retained earnings. Tier2 capital includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation 
reserves.  Common equity is shareholders fund and other capital total regulatory capital minus common equity. Standard errors clustered by bank  are 
reported in brackets and the p-value for the test of significant difference between the pre-crisis and crisis coefficients in parentheses.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tier1*PreCrisis -0.058 -0.064 0.041 0.081
[0.104] [0.123] [0.111] [0.126]
Tier2*PreCrisis -0.11 -0.171
[0.167] [0.183]
Tier1*Crisis 0.282** 0.398** 0.673*** 0.674***
[0.121] [0.172] [0.235] [0.222]




Controls*Crisis x x x x
Controls*PreCrisis x x x x
Country*Year FE x x x x
Nber. Obser. 803 803 745 707
R squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33
Note: (*), (**) and (***) stand for statistically significant at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Robust standard errors




Table 7. Stock market performance and bank leverage: Separate pre-crisis and crisis regressions 
The dependent variable is quarterly bank stock returns. See Table 4 for a detailed description of the estimated model.  In this table report estimates 
for three separate sample period: (1) the pre-crisis period Q1/2006 to Q2/2007; (2) the crisis period Q3/2007 to Q1/2009; (3) and the period following 
Lehman bankruptcy Q3/2008 to Q1/2009. We also allow all coefficients to vary by bank size. Large is a dummy variable that takes value one if the 
bank has total assets above 50 billion US $ and small a dummy that takes value one for all other banks. Tier1 (Tier2) is Tier1 (Tier2) capital scaled 
either by risk-weighted assets (RWR) or total un-weighted assets (LR). Tier1 capital includes shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-cumulative 
preference shares, plus retained earnings. Tier2 capital includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves.  
Common equity is shareholders fund and other capital total regulatory capital minus common equity. Standard errors clustered by bank  are reported 




Table 8. Robustness check: Weighted least squares and alternative clustering 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RWR LR RWR LR RWR LR
Tier1*Large -0.034 0.088 0.165 0.536*** 0.123 0.720**
[0.090] [0.093] [0.154] [0.181] [0.257] [0.323]
Tier1*Small 0.036 0.036 0.08 0.151 0.033 0.141
[0.045] [0.066] [0.114] [0.148] [0.158] [0.214]
Tier2*Large 0.039 -0.053 0.103 0.357 0.008 0.269
[0.101] [0.158] [0.189] [0.283] [0.295] [0.388]
Tier2*Small 0.08 -0.052 0.049 0.161 -0.126 0.28
[0.060] [0.076] [0.130] [0.214] [0.248] [0.369]
Constant -2.575 -5.352** -2.104 -2.248 -0.826 -6.642
[2.417] [2.313] [4.755] [4.258] [6.481] [7.101]
Controls*Large x x x x x x
Controls*Small x x x x x x
Country*Year FE x x x x x x
Nber. Obser. 1820 1650 2229 2076 949 897
R squared 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.23
Note: (*), (**) and (***) stand for statistically significant at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors clustered by bank reported in brackets.
Post-Lehman Pre-Crisis Crisis25 
 
The dependent variable is quarterly bank stock returns. See Table 4 for a detailed description of the estimated model. This table reports estimation results using weighted least 
squares (WLS)  (with weights equal to the inverse of the number of banks reporting in the country), and using standard errors clustered at the country*year  level rather than the 
bank level. The sample period is Q1-2006 to Q1-2009. All control variables are lagged one year.  Crisis is  a dummy that takes value one  from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009. Tier1 (Tier2) 
is Tier1 (Tier2) capital scaled either by risk-weighted assets (RWR) or total un-weighted assets (LR).  Tier1 capital includes shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-cumulative 
preference shares, plus retained earnings. Tier2 capital includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves.  We report estimates for the whole 
sample and the sample of large banks. Large banks are defined as banks with total assets above 50 billion US $. The standard errors are reported in brackets and the p-value for the 
test of significant difference between the pre-crisis and crisis coefficients in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
RWR LR RWR LR RWR LR RWR LR RWR LR RWR LR
Tier1*PreCrisis 0.024 0.113 -0.083 0.05 0.024 0.110 -0.092 0.061 0.024 0.11 ‐0.092 0.061
[0.065] [0.089] [0.256] [0.293] [0.056] [0.088] [0.108] [0.167] [0.074] [0.114] [0.147] [0.189]
Tier2*PreCrisis 0.075 0.009 -0.094 -0.239 0.074 0.006 -0.106 -0.252 0.074 0.006 ‐0.106 ‐0.252*
[0.106] [0.147] [0.315] [0.440] [0.052] [0.059] [0.120] [0.194] [0.055] [0.076] [0.166] [0.135]
Tier1*Crisis 0.117** 0.158** 0.293 0.596*** 0.117** 0.154* 0.264 0.603*** 0.117 0.154** 0.264 0.603**
[0.058] [0.078] [0.192] [0.221] [0.054] [0.083] [0.188] [0.202] [0.080] [0.061] [0.283] [0.275]
Tier2*Crisis 0.049 0.044 0.14 0.484 0.051 0.058 0.131 0.415 0.051 0.058 0.131 0.415
[0.096] [0.128] [0.244] [0.376] [0.080] [0.226] [0.334] [0.493] [0.157] [0.197] [0.226] [0.383]
0.194 -3.355 8.314 4.089 0.244 -0.23 10.286 5.268 0.244 ‐0.23 10.286 5.268
Constant [3.140] [3.380] [17.779] [16.757] [2.357] [2.206] [15.934] [13.426] [3.072] [5.082] [21.074] [15.466]
C o u n t r y * Y e a r  F E xxxx xxxxx x x x
Number of clusters  400 400 91 91 48 48 32 32 13 13 13 13
Nber. of Obser. 4049 3726 827 736 4049 3726 827 736 4049 3726 827 736
R squared 0.23 0.24 0.32 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.33
Note: (*), (**) and (***) stand for statistically significant at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
In parentheses we report the pvalue for the test of equality of effects during crisis and pre crisis. 
Standard errors clustered by quarter
Large banks Large banks
Weighted Least Squares Standard errors clustered by country
Full sample Large banks Full sample Large banks26 
 
Table 9. Controlling for recapitalizations 
The dependent variable is the quarterly stock return. See Table 4 for a detailed description of the estimated 
model. In this table estimate the model introducing a dummy variable that takes value one if the bank has 
received a capital injection from the government in that quarter. Most recapitalizations have occurred in 2008. 
We have identified 103 recapitalizations in the full sample and 44 in the large bank sample. Sources include 
reports from central banks, finance ministries, and press articles. The sample period is Q1-2006 to Q1-2009. All 
control variables are lagged one year. Crisis is a dummy that takes value one  from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009. Tier1 
(Tier2) is Tier1 (Tier2) capital scaled either by risk-weighted assets (RWR) or total un-weighted assets (LR).  
Tier1 capital includes shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-cumulative preference shares, plus retained 
earnings. Tier2 capital includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves.  
We report estimates for the whole sample and the sample of large banks. Large banks are defined as banks with 
total assets above 50 billion US $. Standard errors clustered by bank are reported in brackets, and the p-value 
for the test of significant difference between the pre-crisis and crisis coefficients in parentheses. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RWR LR RWR LR
Tier1*PreCrisis 0.040 0.121** -0.105 0.042
[0.047] [0.061] [0.130] [0.148]
Tier1*Crisis 0.114 0.158 0.236 0.552***
[0.081] [0.110] [0.183] [0.199]
(0.219) (0.677) (0.048) (0.005)
Tier2*PreCrisis 0.088 -0.001 -0.125 -0.261
[0.055] [0.070] [0.144] [0.176]
0.079 0.093 0.066 0.321
Tier2*Crisis [0.099] [0.179] [0.251] [0.347]
(0.924) (0.644) (0.456) (0.170)
Recapitalized -5.374*** -5.118*** -8.577*** -8.202***
[1.142] [1.201] [1.956] [2.290]
Constant 1.547 -1.413 13.933 13.998
[2.765] [2.498] [17.081] [14.104]
Controls*Crisis xx x x
Controls*PreCrisis  xx x x
Country*Year FE xx x x
Nber. of Obser. 4049 3726 827 736
R squared 0.24 0.24 0.36 0.37
Note: (*), (**) and (***) stand for statistically significant at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
In parentheses we report the pvalue for the test of equality of effects during crisis and pre crisis. 
Full sample Large banks27 
 
Table 10. Sample Split by initial capital levels 
The dependent variable is the quarterly stock return.  See Table 4 for a detailed description of the estimated 
model.  The sample period for the stock return is Q1-2006 to Q1-2009. All control variables are lagged one 
year.  Crisis is  a dummy that takes value one from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009. Tier1 (Tier2) is Tier1 (Tier2) capital 
scaled either by risk-weighted assets (RWR) or total un-weighted assets (LR). Tier1 capital includes 
shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-cumulative preference shares, plus retained earnings. Tier2 capital 
includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves.  Common equity is 
shareholders fund and other capital total regulatory capital minus common equity.  RWR stands for risk-
weighted capital ratio and LR for leverage ratio.  In this table we report separate estimates for the sub-samples 
of initially well and poorly capitalized banks. The high capital sub-sample includes banks with capital above the 
sample median in 2006, while the low capital sample includes banks with capital below the sample median in 
2006.  In order to keep a reasonable number of countries in each sub-sample (at least 7 countries) we lower our 
threshold number of banks by country to 3 banks  that is we obtain samples with at least 48 observations per 
country (12 observations per year).  Standard errors clustered by bank  are reported in brackets and the p-value 
for the test of significant difference between the pre-crisis and crisis coefficients in parentheses.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RWR LR RWR LR
Tier1*PreCrisis -0.006 0.111 0.294* 0.18
[0.079] [0.125] [0.162] [0.126]
Tier2*PreCrisis 0.12 -0.044 0.177 0.061
[0.105] [0.123] [0.137] [0.134]
Tier2*Crisis -0.023 -0.455* 0.390* 0.579*
[0.187] [0.268] [0.204] [0.316]
(0.432) (0.129) (0.210) (0.160)
Tier1*Crisis 0.018 -0.048 0.496*** 0.498**
[0.108] [0.163] [0.182] [0.198]
(0.792) (0.126) (0.092) (0.054)
Controls*Crisis x x x x
Controls*PreCrisis x x x x
Country*Year FE x x x x
Nber. Obser. 1857 1795 2192 1931
R squared 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.23
Note: (*), (**) and (***) stand for statistically significant at the 10%, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Robust standard errors
clustered by bank reported in brackets. In parentheses we report the pvalue for the test of equality of effects during crisis and pre crisis. 
High Capital in 2006 Low capital in 200628 
 
Table 11. Credit Default Swaps Premia and bank capital over the financial cycle 
 
The dependent variable is the arithmetic quarterly change in bank (5-year senior tranche MR) CDS premium. 
The sample covers 33 banks operating in 15 different countries. See Table A1 for a list of the countries covered 
and distribution of sample banks across countries. The sample period is Q12006 to Q12009. Tier1 (Tier2) is 
Tier1 (Tier2) capital scaled either by risk-weighted assets (RWR) or total un-weighted assets (LR).  Tier1 
capital includes shareholder funds plus perpetual, non-cumulative preference shares, plus retained earnings. 
Tier2 capital includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves.   D.Equity 
volatility is the change in the quarterly standard deviation of the stock return, D.Capital structure the quarterly 
change in the ratio [Book value of Debt/(Book value of Debt+Market value of equity)], and D.Yield the 
quarerly change in the 10-year government bond yield; for the Euro-Area countries (Germany, Italy, France, 
Spain, Portugal) we use the German yield. Given the small number of banks per country we control for 
regions*year fixed effects  rather than country*year fixed effects. The regions are: Europe, USA, and Asia. See 
Table A3 for a detailed definition of the control variables and sources. All explanatory variables are lagged one 
period (4 quarters) except the Yield which is measured at country level. We report standard errors clustered by 
bank in brackets and the p-value for the test of significant difference between the pre-crisis and crisis 













D. Equity volatility 0.030 0.021 0.028
[0.036] [0.034] [0.039]
D.Capital Structure 5.273* 4.670* 5.053*
[2.762] [2.668] [0.106]
D.Yield ‐0.254*** ‐0.253** ‐0.255**
[0.091] [0.104] [2.764]
Constant ‐0.028 0.051 ‐0.168
[0.227] [0.243] [0.287]
Region*Year x x x
Year  xx x
Observations 248 248 248
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Graphs by Country Name30 
 
Figure 2. Response of Bank Stock Returns to Lagged Bank Capital Before and During the Financial 
Crisis. 
 
The charts plot estimated regression coefficients of a regression of quarterly bank stock 
returns on lagged bank capital. Regressions include country/time dummy variables and 
various control variables as described in Table 4. The coefficients are estimated for two 
alternative measures of bank capital, the risk-adjusted regulatory ratio (RWR) and the 
leverage ratio (LR), and for two alternative samples (the sample of all listed banks in the 
















































































































































LR Full sample LR Large banks
RWR Full sample RWR Large banks
Graphs by Type31 
 
Table A1. Sample coverage 
In this table we report the distribution of banks across countries and a measure of sample coverage (total sample bank assets scaled by 
GDP). Not all banks enter the sample during each quarter; in addition, some banks may be excluded in some specifications if the 
relavant data are missing. So the total number of bank observation included in the sample at each quarter  is less than what is reported 
in this table (between 273 and 313 for the full sample and between 58 and 66 for the large bank sample). Large banks are defined as 
banks with  total assets above $50 billion. The total assets of the large bank sample account for approximately 65 percent of the total 





Full sample Large bank sample CDS sample
Assets as share of GDP 
% (*)
CANADA 11 7 3 57.64
DENMARK 41 1 68.29
FRANCE 6 5 3 22.29
GERMANY 11 8 2 23.41
GREECE 13 2 110.43
HONG KONG 8 1 143.95
ITALY 24 8 6 44.05
JAPAN 99 24 5 73.13




TAIWAN 22 8 2 -
UNITED KINGDOM 10 6 2 25.14
USA 120 25 5 18.23
Total 381 91 33
(*) Full sample , based on 2008 data.32 
 
Table A2. Summary statistics: control variables 
The balance sheet data are yearly for the sample period  2005-2008. The source is BankScope.  The market variables (price-earnings 
ratio, Beta, market to book value of equity) are quarterly for the period Q1-2005 to Q1-2008. The source is Datastream. Liquidity 
includes trading assets,  and loans and advances with a maturity of less than 3 months. Total deposits include savings and demand 
deposits. TA stands for total assets. The beta is defined as the measure of an asset's risk in relation to the market; it is calculated over a 
5-year period using monthly observations. The summary statistics are reported for the whole sample and the sample of large banks. 
Large banks are defined as banks with total assets above 50$ billion. There are up to 381 banks reporting to Bankscope in a year 
among which up to 91 are large banks (the number varies by year and observed capital ratio). Table A1 reported the distribution of 
banks by country.  
 